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ABC pundit Sam Donaldson says the 
economy is “in the dumper…in a deep 
recession.”  Newsweek has a cover 
story on recession, and the stock 
market is down sharply on reces-
sion jitters.  According to polls, more 
than half of Americans believe we 
are already in a recession, and they 
expect overwhelmingly that the econ-
omy will get worse.
  The verdict seems unanimous: The 
economy is in a recession. That’s a rea-
sonable take on current events. After 
all, risky mortgages have cost some 
families their homes, and overzealous 
lenders have lost more than $100 bil-
lion. Add to that plummeting house 
prices, a country still at war, repeated 
trade deficits, a weak dollar, and a 
growing national debt, and presiden-
tial challengers have plenty of reasons 
to talk about change. (Incidentally, 
the party out of office typically talks 
down the economy during presidential 
campaigns; that itself can depress both 
consumer confidence and the stock 
market.)   What’s more, if the economy 
were not in big trouble, why would the 
Fed be cutting interest rates so aggres-
sively, and why would Washington be 
sending most everyone rebate checks? 
  Although the U.S. economy may 
seem on the ropes, don’t count it out 
just yet. Home foreclosures can be 
personal tragedies, and the subprime 
meltdown is a punch in the gut. But 
the U.S. economy has sustained big-
ger hits in the past and still continued 
to grow. For example, in the mid- to 
late-1980s, risky real-estate loans con-
tributed to more than 2,000 bank 
failures, the biggest banking collapse 
since the Great Depression. Shutting 
down those banks and bailing out their 
depositors cost the nation over $400 
billion in today’s dollars. Yet the U.S. 
economy continued to grow during 
those failures, before slipping into a 
brief recession in 1991, about the time 
of the first Gulf war. 
  The recent subprime-loan defaults 
have hurt big and small banks alike, 
but how many banks do you suppose 
have failed so far? Of the nation’s 
16,000 savings and commercial banks, 
only three failed in 2007, and so far in 
2008, only one has failed.  True, many 
mortgage companies have closed their 
doors, costing thousands of jobs, but 
because they get their money from 
financiers, not depositors, the damage 
to the larger community is more con-
tained. 
  During the century prior to World 
War II, economic expansions, on aver-
age, lasted a little longer than reces-
sions (29 months versus 21 months). 
Since World War II, though, expan-
sions have lasted nearly six times lon-
ger than recessions (57 months versus 
10 months).  The current expansion, 
which began in late 2001, is now more 
than 6 years old.  And the expansions 
of the 1980s and the 1990s lasted 
nearly ten years each.    
 One reason the U.S. economy 
can now take a punch better is that 
the Federal Reserve Board has learned 
to do a better job. During the Great 
Depression, the Fed was part of the 
problem, shrinking bank liquidity just 
when otherwise sound banks needed 
to cover depositor withdrawals. Now, 
at the first sign of trouble, the Fed 
assures financial institutions that suf-
ficient liquidity will be there if needed. 
Business media love the breakfast-cere-
al metaphor of a “credit crunch,” but 
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the world is in fact awash in liquid-
ity. The crunching sound these days 
is from lenders, once burned, having 
grown more cautious.  That’s not a bad 
thing.
  Another source of macroeconomic 
resilience is the many automatic sta-
bilizers that have been built into the 
federal budget and, to a lesser extent, 
into state budgets. Progressive income 
taxes, unemployment insurance, wel-
fare benefits, and the earned income 
tax credit were all originally designed 
to redistribute income, and they do 
that. But they also reduce troublesome 
swings in the economy.  
  Since World War II, real GDP 
has declined year-over-year only seven 
times. That’s seven years out of the 
last 60. Consumer spending, which 
accounts for two-thirds of GDP, has 
declined only twice year-over-year—by 
0.8% in 1974 and by 0.3% in 1980.   
Without much fanfare and with little 
public recognition, automatic stabiliz-
ers have been quietly doing their job, 
keeping the economy on a more even 
keel. 
  So I’m not ready to concede that 
the U.S. economy is in a recession or 
even headed for one this year. The same 
goes for the Connecticut economy. But 
for the sake of argument, suppose the 
economy is heading south.  The Fed’s 
interest rate cuts will soften the blow. 
How about the “fiscal stimulus”?  Not 
so much.  People tend to spend less 
of a one-time increase, such as these 
rebates, than they would from a per-
manent increase in income. If they 
expect harder times, they’ll save even 
more of any windfall. More important 
than the rebates are the automatic sta-
bilizers, already in place. 
  If a recession does set in, will its 
duration depend on who gets elected 
president in November? Probably not.   
The average recession since World War 
II has averaged only 10 months (and 
the most recent two recessions aver-
aged only eight months each).  So 
any recession now underway would 
probably be over by the time the next 
president takes the oath of office on 
January 20, 2009. 
  Connecticut’s fortunes will depend 
more on what happens to the Bush tax 
cuts, which are set to expire in 2010.   
Arguably, Connecticut’s state budget 
has recently enjoyed surpluses in part 
because of the Bush tax cuts.
  Many argue that the Bush tax cuts 
were unfair because most of the ben-
efits went to high income households.   
But  rates were actually cut propor-
tionately more for lower income tax-
payers. The top marginal tax rate fell 
by nearly one-eighth, from 39.6% to 
35%,  while the bottom rate dropped 
by one-third, from 15% to 10%.  The 
Bush cuts took millions of families off 
the tax rolls altogether.
  More important for Connecticut 
were the reductions in rates for divi-
dends and capital gains. Top rates were 
cut to 15%.  Those in the two lowest 
income brackets now pay no taxes on 
dividends and capital gains. 
 It is commonly thought that 
“working class families” get whacked 
by federal income taxes, while the 
rich pay less than their fair share.  The 
facts show otherwise.   For the 2004 
tax year, the top 1% of tax filers, 
by income, paid 37% of all federal 
income taxes collected; their average 
tax rate was 24%. The top 10% paid 
68% of all federal income taxes col-
lected; their average tax rate was 19%. 
These two groups pay a higher share 
now than before Bush took office. In 
contrast, the bottom half of all filers 
paid only 3% of all federal income 
taxes collected, and their tax rate aver-
aged only 3%. This incidence pattern 
is roughly the same for Connecticut’s 
income tax.
  It is tempting for politicians, mid-
campaign, to focus on whose total 
tax cut was bigger, rather than on the 
total impact of a new tax structure on 
the economy.  Looking beyond the 
primaries, one might hope for greater 
recognition of the role lower taxes play 
in creating new jobs for middle-class 
folks or those aspiring to be.  It would 
be nice if things changed—but they 
probably won’t.         
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